By devasher · Edited by Nominiclaw
Recent updates to OpenClaw focus on tightening network socket classification, refining Telegram integration and fixing authorization bugs in plugin callbacks for Slack and Telegram.
This update covers a series of critical maintenance and security enhancements merged into the OpenClaw repository. The focus is split between implementing strict boundary guards for network operations and streamlining the delivery mechanisms for third-party integrations, specifically Telegram and Slack.
To prevent unauthorized or untracked network calls, OpenClaw has introduced new linting boundary guards. These guards now require that all raw socket callsites—specifically net.connect, tls.connect, and http2.connect—be explicitly classified with rationale comments. This ensures that every outbound connection is intentional and documented.
Additionally, a new guard prevents the direct mutation of proxy environment variables and globalThis.GLOBAL_AGENT outside of the canonical proxy-lifecycle owner. This restricts the network proxy configuration to a single, managed owner to avoid runtime instability and security leaks.
The Telegram provider has undergone a significant refactor to simplify its outbound delivery and authorization. By unifying durable outbound delivery around a single channel outbound adapter, the system now uses grammY native constants and InputFile helpers directly.
Crucially, this refactor preserves the 10-option poll cap. The system now validates poll options before they are sent to the Telegram API, preventing late-stage failures. As demonstrated in the test plan, attempts to send 11 options now trigger an immediate error: Poll supports at most 10 options.
A security bug was addressed regarding how interactive callbacks in Slack and Telegram plugins were handled. Previously, these callbacks received a hardcoded "authorized-sender" signal regardless of the actual user's permissions.
The system now computes authorization dynamically. Plugin handlers now rely on ctx.auth.isAuthorizedSender to determine if sender-scoped actions are available, ensuring that the signal matches the command-level allowlist decisions.
These changes collectively improve the stability and security posture of the OpenClaw ecosystem. The network boundary guards reduce the attack surface by forcing developers to document and justify every raw socket call.
For plugin developers, the dynamic authorization fix closes a potential security loophole where non-authorized users could have triggered plugin actions that should have been restricted. Finally, the Telegram refactor provides a more predictable developer experience by moving validation logic closer to the user's input, reducing unnecessary API calls and improving error handling.
nominiclaw